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Abstract— A primary source of asymmetric information arises 
from banks’ uncertainty about borrowers ‘Creditworthiness. 
This can generate two types of barriers to efficient credit 
allocation in the loan market: ad-verse selection in the likelihood 
of repayment and moral hazard in the riskiness of firms’ 
business decisions, also affecting repayment. This study 
investigated the consequences of asymmetric information on 
Islamic financial contracts in the Pakistani market for small and 
medium enterprise (SME) business lines of credit. Islamic bank’s 
main financial contracts were discuss the two of them which are 
Istisna and Murabaha .The methods of’ T test’ was conducted to 
ascertain the difference in means of both forms of financing, 
whereas Multiple Regression Analysis using panel data to assess 
the relationship of critical variables with Disbursed amount, 
profit rate, spread, tenor. Data of three year i.e. from 2016 to2018 
of 35 firms, with 105 numbers of observations having istisna and 
Murabaha contract, were taken. The results suggested that both 
the means of Murabaha and istisna financing are significantly 
different in major performance indicators, implicating 
companies that have taken these two financing have performed 
differently. Secondly, in most of the ratio that mattered like 
efficiency and profitability, Murabaha based financing have 
yielded results that are more efficient and better performed as 
compared to istisna) 
Keywords- Asymmetric information; Islamic financial 
contracts; Istisna; Murabaha; Islamic bank; Pakistan;  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background to the Study  
Banking sector serves as the engine of growth for any 
economy. An economy cannot run without the existence of 
banking sector as it channelize the funds from those who have 
excess to those who have opportunities to deploy those funds 
in profit generating activities and share the benefits with the 
owners of the funds. Islamic banking emerged as a practical 
reality and started functioning in 1970s. Since then it has been 
growing continuously all over the world. The global market 
share of Islamic Banking in total Islamic Financial Industry 
(IFI) is equivalent to USD 1,557.5 billion which represents 
76% approx. the Islamic Financial Industry (IFI), which is 
equivalent to USD 2,050.2 billion. The global IFI, which 
comprises of Islamic Banking, Islamic Capital Market and 
Islamic Insurance (Takaful) sector has growth at 8.30%.  
Table 1: 
Breakdown of Global IFI by Sector 
Source: Islamic financial services industry stability report (2018) 
As depicted in above table banking assets forms the largest 
part of IFI. The Islamic finance industry has expanded 
rapidly over the past decade, growing at 10-12% annually. 
Today, Shariah-compliant financial assets are estimated at 
roughly US$2 trillion, covering bank and non-bank 
financial institutions, capital markets, money markets and 
insurance (“Takaful”). In many majority Muslim countries, 
Islamic banking assets have been growing faster than 
conventional banking assets. There has also been a surge 
of interest in Islamic finance from non-Muslim countries 
such as the UK, Luxembourg, South Africa, and Hong 
Kong. 
Islamic Banking and finance has emerged as a potential 
replacement of interest based financial market. The growth 
is not limited to the Muslim dominated countries but also 
shown its foot prints non-Muslim countries. The global 
Islamic banking industry, operating alongside conventional 
financial institutions, has also weathered several systemic 
challenges over the past several years. 1  Major financial 
markets are discovering solid evidence that Islamic finance 
has already been mainstreamed within the global financial 
system – and that it has the potential to help address the 
challenges of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared 
prosperity. 
                                                          
1 Islamic financial services industry stability report (2018),  page 87, 88 
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Sectors of IFI Banking 
Assets 
Sukuk  Islamic 
Funds 
Takaful  Total 
Amount in USD billion 1,557.5 399.9 66.7 26.1 2,050.2 
Percentage Share of Each 
Sector 
75.98% 19.50% 3.25% 1.27% 100% 
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In Pakistan, the banking industry is comprised of 
conventional banking sector and Islamic banking sector 
with 87.1% and 12.9% share respectively State Bank of 
Pakistan (2018). Being the second largest country of 
Muslim population after Indonesia, Pakistan has great 
potential for growth of Islamic Banking and financial 
industry. 
Islamic finance is equity-based, asset-backed, ethical, 
sustainable, environmentally- and socially-responsible 
finance. It promotes risk sharing, connects the financial 
sector with the real economy, and emphasizes financial 
inclusion and social welfare. 
The following key principles guide Islamic Finance:  
1. Prohibition of interest on transactions (Riba);  
2. Financing must be linked to real assets (materiality);  
3. Engagement in immoral or ethically problematic businesses 
not allowed (e.g., arms manufacturing or alcohol 
production);  
4. Returns must be linked to risks.  
 Some of the obvious differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks are the nature of contract on the basis 
of which financing is being extended to the customer and 
mandatory Sharia board supervision of all Islamic banking 
activities including Islamic financing. Islamic banks 
extend financing on the basis of Sharia compliant mode of 
contract while conventional banks provide financing on the 
basis of loan and interest. The other major factor is the 
Sharia governance by Sharia board of every Islamic Bank 
and Islamic banking windows.  
In Islamic credit model, the customers specify goods to be 
purchased through contracts with the bank to acquire on 
customer’s accounts, the banks buy good and attains title 
of ownership from seller, clients take delivery of the 
product and pay on deferred basis and if the client defaults, 
the bank cannot reimburse the penalty charges. Elgari 
(2003). Here, structural difference with regards to 
financing between Islamic and conventional banks is that 
Sharia compliant financing contract should be linked to 
real assets whereas in conventional financing, loan is 
granted and interest is charged based on creditor’s 
riskiness. Subsequently, those funds are utilized to acquire 
asset. This means, no asset is involved directly in contract 
but indirectly as a result of the contract. This would likely 
to lead to the problems of asymmetric information. 
The borrower has better information regarding potential 
returns and risk associated with investment projects for 
which financing are done, than the lenders. This 
information primarily includes borrower real intention of 
utilizing borrowed funds. Lack of information creates 
problems in the financial system on two fronts, before the 
transaction is entered into and after. These problems are 
referred to adverse selection and moral hazards 
respectively Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Adverse Selection 
occurs before making transaction, when those potential 
borrowers who are most likely to produce an undesirable 
outcome-bad credit risk-are the one who most actively 
seeks out a loan and thus most likely to be selected. 
Whereas, Moral hazards occurs after making transaction, 
whereby the borrower might engaged in activities that  are 
undesirable (immoral) from lenders point of view because 
they make it less likely that loan will be paid. These 
activities includes making investment in highly risky 
business such as real estate and property markets while 
taking loans for less risky project. 
Moral hazard produce adverse incentives on bank owners 
to act in way which are contrary to the interest of bank’s 
creditors mainly depositors, by undertaking risky 
investment strategies, which if unsuccessful would 
jeopardize the solvency of the bank. Moral hazard on bank 
owner can become worse by number of factors which may 
force borrowers to choose investments with higher returns 
but with lower probabilities of success Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981). Similarly, Adverse Selection can also affect the 
financial soundness of a bank. Higher lending rate and a 
greater volatility in expected rates of return to borrowers’ 
project can lead to decline in the average quality of the 
pool of the applicants who are willing to borrow from the 
bank. The high creditworthy borrowing customers are 
driven out of the market by higher lending rates. A prudent 
bank would ration credit in this situation Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) 
Reliable collateral may help to mitigate the banks' 
asymmetric information concerns by ensuring repayment 
(Bester, 1985; Chan and Thakor, 1987). To compensate for 
adverse selection risks, banks may refrain from funding 
risky firm. However, in highly competitive markets, banks 
grossly ignore these two conditions making their cash 
flows more instable and can potently lead to higher non-
performing loans (NPL) 
On the contrary, as Islamic financing contract includes real 
asset, the problem of asymmetric information (that 
includes borrower real intention of utilizing borrowed 
funds pre and post transaction) is resolved as funds can 
only be utilized in buying assets mentioned in contract. 
This makes their cash flows more stable and less 
susceptible to have a non-performing financing. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
The presence and consequences of asymmetric information in 
Islamic banks financing markets are of crucial importance for 
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credit allocation and financial development, which make the 
contracts some time, void. Asymmetric information arises 
from banks’ uncertainty about borrowers’ creditworthiness. It 
can occur before or after execution of financial contract. 
Asymmetric information can generate two types of barriers to 
efficient financing in the Islamic financial /banks market:  
1) ad-verse selection in the likelihood of repayment 
2) and moral hazard in the riskiness of firms’ business decisions, 
First is the after effect of holding data that is obscure to 
somewhere around one gathering engaged with the 
agreement and makes the individual or association who 
hold the data have favourable position or get any type of 
advantages, which would have not been gotten if the data 
was known to all gatherings engaged with the agreement, 
This type of asymmetric information leads to adverse 
selection of products or services offered by the firms. 
Islamic bank face this situation when asymmetric of 
information remains unmanaged.  
The second sort of asymmetric information is the 
consequence of exploiting holding explicit data after the 
agreement has been concurred or worked out. Both type of 
issues create the inefficient allocation of financing and 
become the challenge for the validity of contract. The aim 
of this study is to examine at what extant gharar will create 
uncertainty in the Istisna and mudarba contract. 
Islamic banking assets are 12.9% of the whole Pakistani-
banking sector. However, by reviewing the historical data 
it is been revealed that the non-performing financing of 
Islamic banks in Pakistan is quite low (2.7%) as compared 
to overall banking sector non-performing loans (7.9%). 
State Bank of Pakistan (2018)  
Following table depicts the comparative level of non-
performing financing of Islamic Banking and conventional 
banking of last nine quarters spanning from June 2016 to 
June 2018. 
Moreover, Islamic Banking institutions and conventional 
banking institutions are working in the same domestic and 
worldwide macro-economic environment but the non-
performing financing portfolio of the two set of banks are 
different, therefore a need of study is arise to ascertain the 
factor, which are acting differently for different set of 
banks i.e. Islamic and conventional banks. 
We need to ascertain what factors are causing non-
performing portfolios in Islamic and conventional banks.  
Moreover, what are the reasons of their disparity?  
Furthermore does this disparity depict in performance of 
firms taking financing. 
Table 2: Islamic Banking NPF v/s Overall Banking Industry 
Non Performing Financings to Financings (Gross)  
  Islamic Banking Overall Banking Industry 
18-Jun 2.7 7.9 
18-Mar 2.8 8.3 
17-Dec 3 8.4 
17-Sep 3.5 9.2 
17-Jun 3.7 9.3 
17-Mar 3.9 9.9 
16-Dec 4.1 10.1 
16-Sep 4.8 11.3 
16-Jun 4.5 11.1 
Source: Islamic Banking Bulletin of State Bank of Pakistan, Various Quarterly issues 
 
1.3  Gap Analysis 
Handel (2011), (Handel, 2011) Lustig (2011), (J, 2011) and 
Starc (2012) (Stare, 2012) found the effects of adverse 
selection and imperfect competition in US health insurance 
markets. However, they mainly focused on insurance markets 
and no similar work was done to measure the consequences of 
asymmetric information in lending. Few papers provide crude 
evidence of the problem of information asymmetry. For 
example, Bofondi and Gobbi (2006) show that new banks 
entering local markets perform poorly relative to incumbents, 
as entrants experience higher default rates and concentration 
and default rates are positively correlated. Gobbi and Lotti 
(2004) claim that there is a positive correlation between 
branching and markets with low proprietary information 
services. 
Few papers explored impact of asymmetric information in 
Islamic banking. Yousfi (2013) showed that Mudarabah 
enables to mitigate the moral hazard problem and lead the 
entrepreneur to provide the first best levels of effort. On 
the contrary, Musharakah does not solve the moral hazard 
problem. One explanation could be the fact that the two 
parties jointly fund the project and that both of them 
provide non-contractible efforts, which diminish their 
incentives. David Kömling (2014) also studied the link 
between the profit and loss sharing base Islamic financial 
contracts with respect to information asymmetry and 
shows that Musharkah and mudarba base financial contract 
are mostly facing the moral hazard and adverse selection 
problem, but there is limited research on debt base Islamic 
financial contracts like Murabaha and Istisna. Shatha 
(2014) also concluded that the profit and loss-sharing 
contracts are supposed to be vulnerable to any kind of 
asymmetric information problems, as the financier faces 
stronger incentives to closely monitor his clients than he 
would face in a debt like contract.  
Despite the fact that there is a dearth of Islamic financial 
literature focusing on comparative performance of Islamic 
and conventional banks (see among others Aggrawal and 
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Yousef, 2000, Abdul-Majid et al., 2010b, Beck et al., 
2010; and Kablan and Yousfi, 2012), there is a large gap 
that is not covered yet. For instance, academic literature 
does not provide rigorous analysis of the Islamic financial 
product structure, and what are their role under asymmetric 
information, and how to deter opportunistic behaviour of 
borrowers 
There was one study, Crawford etc. al. (2013) (crawford, 
2013) that empirically measured the extent and 
consequences of asymmetric information in borrowing by 
regressing different efficiency factors on variables like 
loan size, tenor, and interest rate of loans.  This riskiness 
influences banks’ pricing of loans as higher interest rates 
attract a riskier pool of borrowers, increasing aggregate 
default probabilities. Data on default, loan size, demand, 
and pricing separately identify the distribution of private 
riskiness from heterogeneous firm disutility from paying 
interest. Results suggest evidence of asymmetric 
information, separately identifying adverse selection and 
moral hazard. However, these studies were not done in the 
context of how financing contracts were designed, neither 
have they carried a comparative analysis for different 
mode of financing, and the information asymmetry in 
each. And above all they were not done in environment of 
a developing country having higher information 
asymmetries. 
Moreover, there was a need to compare conventional and 
Islamic mode of financing with regards to asymmetric 
information, as they are designed different and the problem 
of asymmetric information in Islamic finance is supposed 
to be reduced by transferring physical position of financed 
asset. However, as there are many other factors that are 
different in Islamic and conventional banks, that cannot be 
held constant, making their performance and profitability 
comparison un-reliable. These are size of business, their 
past loan history and their stage in business life cycle. 
Businesses that are more stable and mature normally have 
long term credit history with conventional banks thereby 
reducing many of the problems of asymmetric information 
such as moral hazards and adverse selection. Islamic banks 
are relatively new and are facing more information 
asymmetry. Hence comparing those with conventional 
banks might not give credible results as we are purely 
focusing on the problems of asymmetric information that 
arrived from the way financing contracts were designed.  
A work around was to compare mode of financing within 
Islamic bank that doesn’t involved new assets being 
purchased (Istisna) with that in which new assets are 
purchased (Murabaha). In istisna financing, the bank order 
to manufacture some goods to the and then by an agency 
agreement customer sell those goods to end buyer firms 
existent asset is purchased by bank and leased or sale back 
to firm on deferred payment, effectively giving money to 
firm that can theoretically utilized that in more risky 
businesses. And because that intention is not known, this 
information asymmetry would lead to the problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Whereas in Murabaha, 
new assets is purchased directly by bank from the third 
party and after taking physical or constructive possession, 
it is sold or leased to that firm, affectively not getting 
money that could be invested somewhere else, but as asset. 
This will reduce the problem of information asymmetry. 
Hence, in this way factors discussed above were 
affectively controlled for.   
Moreover, to keep other bank specific factor constant (that 
are different within Islamic banks), we select customers 
from a single bank. We selected Meezan bank as it’s a 
largest full fledge Islamic bank in Pakistan.  Moreover, 
Country Pakistan is selected as Islamic banking is 
relatively new but rapidly growing at the rate of 14%. And 
new banks seemed to have more information asymmetry of 
borrowers as compared to old established banks where 
borrowers have long credit history. 
 
1.4 Research Objective and Significance 
In this paper, we measure the consequences of asymmetric 
information in the Pakistani market for small business lines of 
credit. This riskiness influences banks’ pricing of loans as 
higher interest rates attract a riskier pool of borrowers, 
increasing aggregate default probabilities. To measure the 
distribution of asymmetric firm riskiness, we estimate models 
of loan size, profit rate on financing, tenor of financing, and 
default spread.  
Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), (Weiss, 1981) we 
assume firms seek lines of credit to finance the on-going 
activities associated with a particular business project, the 
riskiness of which is private information to the firm. In fact 
those firms know the riskiness of their own project, but 
banks can only observe the average riskiness of their 
borrowers, conditional on observable firm characteristics. 
For a given interest rate, firms’ expected profits are 
increasing with risk due to the insurance effect of loans: 
banks share a portion of the costs of unsuccessful projects. 
As a result, higher-risk firms are more willing to demand 
higher-rate loans. This, in turn, influences the profitability 
and performance of the borrowing firms. As firms invest in 
risky business due to asymmetric payoffs, their 
profitability and performance is compromised. Banks 
credit department filter out these risky firms through their 
credit rating, collateral and business risk. Financing rates 
are charged depending on these characteristics. Since they 
would grant financing for a particular business and in 
particular conditions, this would make the firm more 
disciplined, and efficiency thereby increasing their 
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performance. However, there is always a chance that firm 
invest that money somewhere else ex-post. Since bank is 
not aware of firm’s intention, that information asymmetry 
would not only increase risk and lowering the profitability 
of the bank, but also for the firms themselves. For this 
reason, higher rates for any bank also worsen the risk 
composition of its accepted loans. This increases its 
aggregate default rates, lowering its profitability. 
In this study, we analyzed two Islamic financial contracts 
istisna and Murabaha to assess the impact of information 
asymmetry on borrowers’ performance. We employ 
independent t-test as well as regression and co-relation to 
assess the extent of information asymmetry affecting their 
performance.  
We also did a comparative analysis of these two modes of 
financing. Four variables were proposed which can affect 
the Islamic banks financing contracts especially in 
Murabaha and Istisna in the environment of asymmetry 
information. We investigated separately for both Islamic 
financial contracts and their impact on asset and liabilities 
that can affect any firm or complete sector.  
This will help identify the main reasons for moral hazard 
and adverse selection so that the bank will select the 
techniques to reduce it. This would also help the bank to 
avoid the impact of asymmetric information while using 
these two products. 
1.5 Research Question  
Particularly, the discussion in this study to review the 
following questions: 
1. How is the business concept of Islam in the system of 
financing in Islamic banking helps to tackle the problem of 
information asymmetry. 
2. By tackling asymmetric information problem like moral 
hazards and adverse selection, How it affect the ex post 
performance of the borrowers 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This section of study examines the previous studies, concepts, 
methodologies from other researchers. Most of the studies 
have done on conventional sector to analyses the relationship 
between the asymmetric information and companies financing 
and investment decisions. Both in conventional and Islamic 
financing and investment tools.  
 (Yousfi, 2013) (Yousfi, Asymmetric information and 
islamic financial contracts, 2018) showed that Mudarabah 
enables to mitigate the moral hazard problem and lead the 
entrepreneur to provide the first best levels of effort. These 
efforts depend on the level of risk of the project. First, the 
profit share of the entrepreneur depends closely on the 
level of risk of the project. Second, the threat to have no 
payment in case of failure increases the entrepreneur's 
incentives. On the contrary, Musharakah does not solve the 
moral hazard problem. One explanation could be the fact 
that the two parties jointly fund the project and that both of 
them provide non-contractible efforts which diminish their 
incentives. 
Shatha (2014) (Shatha, 2014) concluded that, the majority 
of the Islamic investments attributed to Murabaha and 
ignores the other Islamic investment "Istisna". Islamic 
banks working in Jordan, the majority of the Islamic 
investments attributed to Murabaha and, Istesna’a 
percentage are very low, less than 3%. Although 
comparisons is being done between the both type of 
contracts which highlight that the profit and loss-sharing 
contracts are supposed to be vulnerable to any kind of 
asymmetric information problems, as the financier faces 
stronger incentives to closely monitor his clients than he 
would face in a debt like contract.  
Aggarwal, R.K. and T. Yousef (2000) (Aggarwal, 2000) 
studied the set of instruments used by Islamic banks to 
finance projects in Muslim countries given that Islamic 
Law prohibits the charging of interest. The evidence 
indicates that the bulk of the financing operations of 
Islamic banks do not conform to the principle of profit-
and-loss sharing (e.g., equity contracts). Instead, most of 
the financing is based on the markup principle, and is very 
debt-like in nature. They also imply that economies 
characterized by adverse selection and mora hazard will be 
biased towards debt financing.  
Abdul-Majid, M.; Saal, D.; Battisti (2010) (Abdul- Majid, 
2010) investigated the efficiency of Islamic and 
conventional banks in 10 countries that operate Islamic 
banking for the period 1996–2002.  They found that 
Islamic banking appears to be associated with higher input 
usage. They also found that Islamic banks are found to 
have moderately higher returns to scale than conventional 
banks. 
Beck et. al. (2010) (Beck, 2010) showed that many of the 
conventional products can be redrafted as Sharia-
compliant products, so that the differences are smaller than 
expected. While Islamic banks seem more cost-effective 
than conventional banks in a broad cross-country sample, 
however, conventional banks that operate in countries with 
a higher market share of Islamic banks are more cost-
effective but less stable. There is also consistent evidence 
of higher capitalization of Islamic banks and this capital 
cushion plus higher liquidity reserves explained the 
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relatively better performance of Islamic banks during the 
recent crisis. 
Kablan and Yousfi (2012) (O.Yousfi, 2012) analyzed 
Islamic banks efficiency over the period 2001-2008. They 
found that they were efficient at 78.9%. The level of 
efficiency could however vary according to regions. Asia 
displays the highest score with 84.64%. Country like 
Malaysia and Pakistan implemented reforms in order to 
allow Islamic banks to better cope with the existing 
financial system. They also found that Market power and 
profitability have negative impact on Islamic banks 
efficiency. Concentration leads to higher costs through 
slacks and inefficiency. Again other results from 
robustness checks appear to stress the specificity of 
Islamic banks, like their first aim for financing rural 
population 
2.1 Asymmetric information 
Ugo Albertazzi etc. al. (2014) (Ugo Albertazzi, 2014) 
analyzed Asymmetric information in securitization deals is 
based on a unique dataset comprising a million mortgages. 
The main finding was that securitized mortgages have a lower 
default probability than non-securitized ones. Crawford etc. al. 
2018) also studied the effects of asymmetric information and 
imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of 
credit. They found evidence of adverse selection in the form of 
a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of 
demand for credit and default. While increases in adverse 
selection increase prices and defaults on average, reducing 
credit supply, banks’ market power can mitigate these 
negative effects. 
Lester et al. (2017) (Lester, 2017) show that equilibrium 
contracts in insurance and credit markets are jointly 
determined by adverse selection and market power, and 
that increased competition and reduced informational 
asymmetries can be detrimental for welfare. 
Karlan and Zinman (2009) (Karlan, 2009) estimated the 
presence and importance of hidden information and hidden 
action problems in a consumer credit market using a new 
field experiment methodology. They randomized 58,000 
direct mail offers to former clients of a major South 
African lender along three dimensions: (i) an initial "offer 
interest rate" featured on a direct mail so licitation; (ii) a 
"contract interest rate" that was revealed only after a 
borrower agreed to the initial offer rate; and (ii) a dynamic 
repayment incentive that was also a surprise and extended 
preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who 
remained in good standing. They found strong evidence of 
moral hazard and weaker evidence of hidden information 
problems. A rough estimate suggests that perhaps 13% to 
21% of default is due to moral hazard.  
Jalaluddin and Metwally (1999), (Jalaluddin, 1999) 
showed a positive relationship between the probability of 
financing through PLS and the business risk. This means 
that an entrepreneur with a risky project is more willing to 
enter into a PLS contract rather than an entrepreneur with a 
lesser risky project. They also found that if the costs of 
borrowing (through interest) are high, the probability of 
financing through PLS is higher. In addition, they found 
negative relationships between the probability of PLS 
funding and some independent variables. 
Safieddine (2009) (Safieddine, 2009) has done an 
investigation of the investment accounts of Islamic banks. 
He applied agency theory to the banks and found that 
investment account holders expose their money to risks but 
lack influence on the management. As, Investment 
accounts of Islamic banks are created through a so called 
"two-tier mudarabah" the depositor is therefore exposed to 
risks associated with the investment decision of the bank, 
but the bank does not face any risk, because in the 
mudarabah contract the supplier of funds is solely liable 
for losses. If the investment accounts holders' lack 
influence and monitoring possibilities on the management 
due to difficulties gathering information, then there is 
room for agency problems.  
Khan (1989) (Khan, 1989) developed a model which is 
used to compare variable return schemes (VRS, like equity 
or PLS) withfixed return schemes (FRS, like debt or mark-
up). He found that under the assumption of symmetric 
information the VRS dominates, because it spreads the risk 
much better than does FRS. As soon as he relaxes the 
assumption of symmetric information, the FRS becomes 
the dominant method of financing. According to Khan 
(1989) the dominance of FRS under asymmetric 
information has two reasons. First, lesser monitoring takes 
place because only a "reported return below the fixed 
return is suspicious". Second, the FRS allows for lower 
monitoring costs because it "minimizes information 
requirements". Because of these two reasons, he concludes 
that the dominance of the debt contract stems from the 
asymmetric information problem observed in practice. 
David Kmling (2014) (mling, 2014) compared the 
asymmetric information problem between a debt like 
contract and an equity like contract. It proved that profit 
and loss sharing contracts are more beneficial to make the 
project successful because it minimizes the risk of 
maximum losses. 
Rifki ismail (2014) (Isma, 2014) in another theoretical 
study, gave the assessment of moral hazard in Murabaha 
financing which shows the impact of information 
asymmetric in moral hazard in relation with price risk 
(which is the volatility of commodity price). The study 
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also shows which steps can be taken when the honest 
default occurs and when dishonest default occurs.  
Kaouther Jouaber (2012) (Kaouther Jouaber, 2012) also 
showed the asymmetric information impact in the shape of 
moral hazard in Murabah financing, the study aim was to 
analyze the price risk in the context of moral hazard, and 
price was dependent variable to select the customer by 
bank. 
Alsayyed,(2010) (Alsayyed, 2010) studied the uses of 
Commodity Murabaha, and found that Murabaha is clearly 
the Islamic treasurer’s funding product of choice, as it is 
flexible enough to facilitate many structures for financing, 
hedging, and currency exchanging 
Paolo Pietro Biancone and Maha Radwan (2018) studied 
that the unconventional financing alternatives could 
positively (Radwan, 2018) impact international economics 
and be a viable potential alternative for financing with its 
diversified instrument for social enterprise development. 
III. METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Theoretical framework of study: 
Moral hazard in Islamic based financial contracts can take 
different forms, which vary according to the type and nature of 
the contract between the bank and the client. The most 
common factors triggering moral hazard are: (i) the borrower 
using the funds for different purposes than agreed with the 
bank; (ii) the borrower not reporting the profit correctly and 
truthfully; and (iii) holding inside information used against the 
interest of the bank. 
To tackle the moral hazard problem the bank needs to 
regularly monitor the performance of the borrowers by 
obtaining and screening various types of financial information, 
such as statement of financial position, profit and loss account, 
cash flow statement, and statement of change in equity. Banks 
also send inspectors to firms to monitor borrowers’ progress. 
Investigating moral hazard leads to additional costs to the 
bank and the outcome of investigation can be either a 
success or fail. Where: MC is the monitoring cost. If the 
moral hazard is detected the bank takes back the remaining 
value of the asset financed and needs to forgo the mark-up. 
If the moral hazard is not detected then the bank bears the 
monitoring costs and the borrower continuous to retain the 
asset. 
 
Chart: costs for impact of asymmetric information 
 
Use of incentive can overcome the problem of asymmetric 
information in Islamic financial contracts.it will encourage 
the borrowers to provide the critical data of company that 
save the Islamic financial institutions from moral hazard. 
In Istisna the industry practice is that bank after purchasing 
the product from customer appoint him as agent of sale in 
the market on incentive basis, so this lead to work the 
customer as an agent smoothly that will safeguard the bank 
from moral hazard and on the other hand customer don’t 
complete his responsibility his incentive become zero so 
that bank can cover its share of loss of financing cost. 
The risk of adverse selection can be solving by taking 
security /collateral from the customer, this shows the 
customer creditworthiness. So bank can cover his 
repayment risk in Murabaha by disposing off the security 
Islamic bank also use the credit rationing techniques as the 
conventional do to resolve the issue of adverse selection, after 
some period of time bank can gathered a comprehensive data 
about the good and bad customer with which prevent him 
from loss. 
 
3.2 Process Flow 
3.2.1 Murabaha 
The following process flow serves as the basic Process Flow 
for Murabaha financing (excluding Spot Murabaha). Any 
customer willing to avail Murabaha financing must accept this 
process flow along with the Customer Specific Details and 
provide acknowledgement on the format attached.).  After the 
necessary Credit and Shariah Approvals, Bank and the 
customer will enter into MMFA and Agency Agreement for 
the purchase of goods. 
The Bank Representative will educate customer about the 
Murabaha process and especially about the importance of 
placing Order Form to Bank before/along with finalizing 
order with supplier and well before the dispatch of goods 
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from the supplier’s premises, signing of Declaration and 
Murabaha Contract before consumption of goods and 
storing the purchased stock of goods separately from the 
stock already present in the warehouse for proper 
identification. 
As an agent, the customer will negotiate the price of the 
goods in the market for Bank and finalize the details with 
the suppliers and deliver an Order Form to the bank 
before/along with finalizing order with supplier (before the 
dispatch of goods from the supplier’s premises).  
The disbursement must be done at the time when the 
customer has to make the payment to the supplier. This 
implies that in case of Advance Payment, the disbursement 
will be done at the time of the Order Form. In case of 
Credit Payments, the disbursement will be done later i.e. at 
the expiry of the supplier’s credit period (which is 
normally after the Declaration and Murabaha Contract). 
The disbursement will be made to customer’s account with 
BANK for onward payment to the Supplier via any 
approved payment instrument in favour of suppliers. 
The customer will provide copy of this payment 
instrument payment evidence to BANK for 100 % of the 
sub Murabaha transactions. 
Upon receipt of goods, the customer will declare the goods 
through Declaration Form in the days mentioned in the 
Customer Specific Details along with providing the 
purchase evidences Goods receipt evidence for 100 % 
of the sub Murabaha transactions.  
Simultaneously, customer will give an offer to BANK to 
purchase the goods via Murabaha Contract. It must be 
ensured by the customer that the goods are not consumed 
before signing of Declaration Form & Murabaha 
contract. 
In case of Partial deliveries, separate Partial Declaration 
form and Murabaha contract must be executed 
immediately for each delivery trench. 
To ensure that goods are not consumed before signing of 
Declaration form & Murabaha contract, the Bank 
Representative will also perform random physical 
inspections of purchased stock in the no. of Sub Murabaha 
transactions mentioned in the Customer Specific Details & 
telephonic confirmation report  (in case physical inspection 
is not conducted) will also be enclosed with the declaration 
form & Murabaha contract. 
Upon Confirmation, BANK will accept the offer by 
signing the Murabaha contract and the ownership of assets 
will transfer to the customer. At this stage, the tenor of sub 
Murabaha, contract price and payment schedule will be 
finalized through Payment Schedule. 
In order to ensure that acceptance of Murabaha Contract 
is communicated to the customer, the Bank 
representative must communicate the acceptance of 
Murabaha Contract to the customer via 
email/telephone/fax etc immediately on the same day of 
acceptance of Murabaha Contract. For record and control 
purposes the Bank's representative must also mention over 
the Murabaha Contract the date and mode of 
communication of acceptance along with name of the 
customer's representative to whom acceptance was 
communicated. In case of email of fax, a copy of the same 
maybe attached.  
The customer will settle Sub Murabaha on or before the 
maturity from its own sources 
3.2.2 Istisna    
The following process flow serves as the basic Process Flow 
for Istisna financing. Any customer willing to avail Istisna 
financing must accept this process flow along with the 
Customer Specific Details and provide acknowledgement on 
the format attached.   
After the necessary Credit and Shariah Approvals, Bank 
and the customer will enter into MIFA and Agency 
Agreement for the Sale of goods Manufactured by 
customer  
The Bank Representative will educate customer about the 
Istisna process and especially about the importance of 
placing written offer to Bank before/along with finalizing 
order, signing of Declaration and Istisna Contract before 
selling the goods in the market on behalf of bank agent. 
As a manufacturer, the customer will negotiate the price of 
the goods with the Bank, finalize the details with the bank, 
and deliver a Written Offer to the bank before/along with 
finalizing order.  
The disbursement must be done at the time when the 
customer has to make the Written Offer to the Bank. In 
cases there should be Advance Payment which generates 
the running for customer.  
Upon receipt of goods, the customer will declare the goods 
through GRN (Goods receiving note) in the days 
mentioned in the Customer Specific Details along with 
verified quality.  
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Simultaneously, customer will give an offer from Bank to 
sell the goods via sale Contract. The customer act as 
agent with agency fees also customer has given an 
incentive also which is over and above the bank target 
selling price.in this price bank can receive it’s 
In istisna customer to settle the bank payment on maturity 
from original proceeds from end buyer, customer is not 
allowed to repay to from his own resource because it is not 
the loan transaction but it is sale base sharia mode of 
financing. 
3.2.3 Murabaha vs Istisna with respect to moral hazard 
and adverse selection 
Both the Islamic financial contracts have risk of moral hazard 
and adverse selection but they have difference in stages where 
both the problems exists, e.g. in Murabaha adverse selection 
risk exist when customer credit proposal is in approval process 
if the customer hide his some information form Islamic bank 
which purely the customer have and bank has no direct excess 
on that information. For example after providing proper 
security to bank for approval of credit proposal and on its 
behalf customer receive the disbursement for bank and 
supplier is fake or he has make fake settlement with supplier 
which is his partner but is not disclose in any document. In 
this situation in case of disbursement to customer if bank 
identify this issue of adverse selection bank only can receive 
its principle amount without profit bank only black list the 
customer in future but in Istisna also the issue but bank can 
mitigate this by two ways, one is that the bank can ask the 
customer to disburse the amount verification of manufactured 
good if the product received on time bank made payment 
otherwise bank can apologies to disburse but by this way the 
Istisna product will not remain viable for industry because its 
nature is to cooperate with customer to fulfill his running 
finance needs.in second option bank can ask the customer to if 
the customer fails to deliver the product at delivery time he is 
bound to deliver the goods by purchasing from market and 
also bank can stop the customer factory produced to deliver to 
any other person and get it delivered to bank itself by force, 
finally bank has no need to receive the disbursed amount 
without profit but sometime this is risk in Murabaha.     
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Data 
To attain the objective of this study, a primary annual data 
from 2016 to 2018 is selected. This data is selected from 
Meezan Bank of Pakistan‘s small and medium enterprise 
(SME) and commercial customers. The number, of 
observations are 105 from Murabaha customers and 50 
observations are from istisna financing customers. The data is 
selected on basis of their disbursement, profit rate, tenure, 
along with balance sheet and income statement figures. Data 
of above-mentioned financing customers were collected from 
directly from Meezan Bank record. In data the mean, standard 
deviation, and probability shows significance level, probability 
in all is less than 0.5 which consider very efficient in industry 
Table 3: 
Descriptive Statistic (Murabaha financing) 
Table 4: 
Descriptive Statistic (istisna financing) 
See both in last of article 
When we make comparison in both modes of Islamic 
financing we found that probability of both the financing is 
have level of significance e in Murabaha the  level is very high 
because all independent variables in relation with dependent 
variable have probability under the acceptable range but in 
istisna probability of dependent variable have negative relation 
with independent variable but it does not affect the real factor 
which shows that the istisna financing on ROE, ICR, FAT 
does not have any impact. 
4.2 Variables 
This section explains the econometric models used for 
measuring impact of disbursed amount (DA), spread, profit 
rate (PR) and tenor on various efficiency indicators like Profit 
Margin (PM), Total assets turnover (TAT), Equity multiplier 
(EM), Fixed Asset turnover (FAT), Return on Assets (ROA), 
and interest Coverage Ratio (ICR).  
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The process of data selection and collection and issues arising 
are discussed here. This is followed by an overview explaining 
the list of variables used in the econometric models. Variables 
are explained as under. 
1. Disbursed Amount: This measured the amount volume 
of loan sanctioned to the borrower. This amount is 
disbursed to a needy customer after approving its credit 
proposal from business unit, risk, CAD, management 
office and from sharia Dept. 
2. Spread: This depicts credit default spread, i.e. 
additional rate charged over and above the risk free rate to 
compensate for the probability of default, higher the 
probability of default, higher would be the spread. These 
percentages vary from customer to customer as well as on 
basis of amount financed and its tenor. 
3. Profit Rate: The rate of profit charged by the bank on 
the financing amount. The profit rate is the percentage of 
principle amount being financed from a commercial bank 
to its customer usually it followed by a well-known 
benchmark like KIBOR, LIBOR etc. 
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4. Tenor: The maturity period of the financing, after this 
period, the principal become due. 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
Our main variables consisted of Profit Margin (PM), Total 
assets turnover (TAT), and Equity multiplier (EM). These 
three financial ratios are decomposition of Return of Equity 
(ROE) ratio, and known as DuPont Equation. The Du-Pont 
equation in profitability analysis explains the drivers of 
profitability in detail with three drivers which are asset 
turnover, financial leverage, and profit margin. Succinctly, the 
DuPont model enables the analyst to ascertain whether the 
overall profitability of a firm is (1) emanating from the firm’s 
income minus expenses (profit margin), (2) a result of 
effective and efficient use of organization’s asset (ATO), (3) 
stemming from the mix equity and debt employed by the 
company (capital structure), or any combination of these 
factors (Turner, Broom, Elliott & Lee, 2015). (Turner, 2015) 
Each of the factors is briefly explained below 
1. Margins: net income/total revenue. High margins are 
often associated with organizations that are involved in 
rendering niche services / products, have stringent control 
over its cost structure (economies of scales or effective use 
of assets), and the ones enjoying monopolistic market 
conditions. 
2. Efficiency: Asset Turnover Ratio is a metric most 
commonly used for measuring firm’s efficiency by 
dividing total sales with total assets. It allows the users of 
financial information to assess how effectively the firms is 
capitalizing its assets in generating profitability 
3. Financing Policy: The third component of DuPont 
model pertains to measurement of company’s financial 
leverage by means of equity multiplier. It is a financial 
ratio determined by dividing a company's total asset value 
by total net equity. 
Other ratios that depicted performance were also analysed, 
these includes 
4. Fixed Asset Turnover: It is used by analysts to 
measure operating performance. This efficiency ratio 
compares net sales (income statement) to fixed assets 
(balance sheet) and measures a company's ability to 
generate net sales from its fixed-asset investments, 
namely property, plant, and equipment (PP&E). In general, 
a higher fixed asset turnover ratio indicates that a company 
has more effectively and efficiently utilized its fixed 
assets. 
5. Return on assets (ROA): is an indicator of how 
profitable a company is relative to its total assets. ROA 
gives a manager, investor, or analyst an idea as to how 
efficient a company's management is at using its assets to 
generate earnings 
6. Interest coverage ratio is a debt ratio and profitability 
ratio used to determine how easily a company can pay 
interest on its outstanding debt. The interest coverage ratio 
may be calculated by dividing a company's earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) during a given period by the 
company's interest payments due within the same period. 
The Interest coverage ratio is also called “times interest 
earned.” Lenders, investors, and creditors often use this 
formula to determine a company's riskiness relative to its 
current debt or for future borrowing. 
4.3 Methodology 
We attempted 3 pronged approach for analysing the 
problems of moral hazards and adverse selection. At first, 
we compare the mean and variance of different efficiency 
and performance measure and performed independent t test 
to ascertain whether the performance to the two modes of 
finance statically different. 
4.3.1 Performance comparison of the two modes of 
financing 
The first four dependent variables were financing details and 
subsequent six variables are performance details of three years 
after financing have being taken. We hypothesized that in 
Murabaha financing, where problems of asymmetric 
information is less because of position transfer mechanism 
discussed above, this will more efficiently be utilized in the 
business, these funds would not be diverted in other risky 
sectors that would increase the risk and reduce the 
performance in long run. In short run, they might benefit from 
the windfall profit in risk businesses but due to stochastic 
nature of risky returns, these will cancel off in long run 
thereby decreasing the performance and efficiency.  
Table 5: T-Test: 
Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
See in last of article 
Table 4 showed that the input variables do not depict any 
significant difference apart from disbursed amount. 
Especially the profit rate and spread that depict the 
riskiness of investment didn’t seemed to differ 
significantly (p value 0.99, and 0.23). This means that both 
modes of financing have more or less the same risk level 
of customers. Despite the fact that on average Murabaha 
financing has slightly more maturity that is significantly 
different. 
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On the other hand, the output variables depict a slightly 
different picture. Two out of three DuPont measures 
showed mildly significantly difference among them. With 
both profit margin and turnover that showed demand and 
supply side performance and efficiency respectively are on 
average higher for Murabaha financing. Where tijara and 
istisna is mainly benefiting from leverage however the 
difference showed insignificant. The other ratios like ROA 
and interest coverage, also shown better performance for 
Murabaha financing with higher mean and both significant 
at 10% and 5% respectively.  
This analysis showed two major findings 
1. Both the means of Murabaha and istisna financing are 
significantly different in major performance indicators, 
implicating companies that have taken these two financing 
have performed differently. 
2. In most of the ratio that mattered like efficiency and 
profitability, Murabaha based financing have yielded 
results that are more efficient and better performed as 
compared to istisna. 
 
4.4 Correlation analysis 
Table 6: 
Correlations (Murabaha financing) 
Table 7: 
Correlations (istisna financing) 
See in last of article 
The above two tables showed coefficient of correlation among 
the variables of Istisna and Murabaha financing. It is evident 
that a moderate correlation exists between disbursed amount 
and the profit rate. Spread is also highly correlated with tenor 
for Istisna financing. Tenor is also moderately linked with the 
profit rate. This kind of relationship is not evident in case of 
Murabaha financing. This showed that Istisna more closely 
behaved with debt security then Murabaha. ROA and profit 
margins seems to have high correlation as expected, this 
suggested that main driver for return were demand led growth 
rather than supply led efficiencies. 
4.5 Regression Analysis: 
We apply multi-regression analysis to analyse the impact of 
disbursed amount, spread, profit rate, and tenor. We made 
fourteen models, the first six models were regressed with the 
total asset, total liabilities, sale, and net profit. In this analysis, 
we consider total asset, total liabilities, sale, net profit as 
independent variables and disbursed amount, spread, profit 
rate as dependent variable. 
We employ the following regression equation 
Y’ = α + β1 TA + β2TL + β3SALE + β4NP  
The rest of the models were regressed in different 
performance ratios. These included Profit Margin (PM), 
Total Assets Turnover (TAT), earning multiplier (EM) as a 
proxy of leverage, Fixed Assets Turnover (FAT) to assess 
the quality of fixed assets, Return on Assets (ROA), and 
Interest coverage ratio (ICR) 
We employ this in the following regression equation 
Y’ = α + β1PM+ β2TAT + β3 EM + β4 FAT + β5 ROA + β6 
ICR 
Table 8: 
Regression equation result 
See in last of article 
In model 1, Disbursed amount is significantly affected by 
total assets, where in model 2 (Istisna) it remained 
insignificant. This showed that in Murabaha financing, 
more assets leads to more loans as expected, but not for 
Istisna. This could be because the Istisna have no direct 
effect on customer assets as in Istisna customer produce 
the goods and sell to the customer/ultimate buyer. 
Similarly, total Liabilities have a more significant effect on 
Disbursed amount in case of Istisna. This means more 
borrowing in case of more liability. It could be a sign that 
company is utilizing additional borrowing so where else. 
However, it is not the case in Murabaha due injection of 
payment in real asset as bank try to utilizes the amount in 
real purchasing. 
Total Assets have more pronounced effect in Spreads in 
model 3 (Murabaha).  More asset leads to lesser spread as 
accepted for Murabaha, but for Istisna, the relationship is 
inversed. This means that assets quality was not captured 
in Istisna leading moral hazards. Spread was also seemed 
to be influenced by total liabilities in Istisna financing 
(model 4). This clearly showed, more liability, leads to 
more spread for Murabaha, but not for Istisna this mean 
information is not properly absorbed in spreads for the 
case of Istisna.  
Similar to spreads and total assets, the profit rate were also 
significantly influenced in Assets in case of Murabaha, this 
indicated increase in assets followed by more risky 
financing. Similarly, liabilities also have a significant 
effect in profit rate as in spread. Means risky investment 
were charged more in case on Murabaha, lowering the 
problems in information asymmetry. The factors in Istisna 
remained insignificant. 
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In model 7 (Table 8), Profit margin had a strong and 
significant impact on disbursed amount for Murabaha 
financing as compared to Istisna. This means, in case of 
Murabaha, higher profits are better captured by banks, and 
disbursed amount are better utilized. The reason is that, in 
Islamic financial contracts, banks focus on sale contract for 
customer financing.  
Whereas, disbursed amount were not seemed to be effected 
from quality of fixed assets for both model 7 and 8.  
Disbursed amount was also affected by financial leverage 
for model 7 (Murabaha). This showed higher 
disbursement, leads to increase leverage effect, this would 
ultimately be increasing riskiness of ROE, whereas that 
relationship is not significant in Istisna. Similarly, in 
model 7 and 8, quality of fixed assets didn’t seem to effect 
the disbursed amount in both the cases. 
Table 9: Regression equation result 
See in last of the article 
 
The effect of return on asset (ROA) on dispersed amount 
was highly significant for Murabaha, whereas insignificant 
for Istisna. This showed borrowing are affectively utilized 
in Murabaha as compared to Istisna, the reason behind is 
that in Murabaha customer purchases the goods from bank 
at the market rate. That variation in prices produced more 
effect on return on equity (ROE). However, customer 
cannot capitalized on higher market rate as in Istisna, 
because customer sell the goods to bank, and now bank 
can set the price that would not necessarily depicted in 
market. High significance of interest coverage ratio on 
disbursed amount in model 7 showed Istisna business have 
more safely covered from default risk. 
In model 9 and 10, different performance variables were 
regressed on default spreads. Profit margin have highly 
significant effect on default spread, for both cases, this 
showed risky projects were effectively captured by the 
bank in higher spreads. Similarly, financial risk due to 
leverage was also captured adequately in default spreads in 
case of Murabaha. 
Higher spread also leads to lower total assets turnover in 
model 9, according to expectations, whereas the 
relationship is inverse and significant to Istisna (model 10). 
This could mean, in Istisna, fund were invested in those 
areas where risk was not captured by the bank, evidence of 
asymmetric information. 
Similarly, spreads are also being influenced by financial 
leverage (EM) for Istisna but the effect remained 
insignificant at 5%, showing information asymmetries not 
fully captured by the bank 
In Model 9 (murabah), fixed asset turnover, had a strong 
and significant effect on default spreads.  This indicated 
that better fixed assets utilization increase their turnover at 
a higher spread. This means more risky business are 
utilizing funds efficiently, however it remained 
insignificant for istisna case. This relationship is also valid 
to Return on assets, as both is significantly influencing the 
spreads. 
In model 11 and 12, financing rates were negatively 
affected by profit margin for both forms, indicating risky 
investments seems to have lower profitability, the effect is 
however insignificant for Murabaha  maybe because of 
better utilization of financing. The same effect is witnessed 
for total assets turnover. 
Financial leverage also negatively affected that financing 
rate as in case with spreads. The effect is significant for 
Istisna (model 12) 
Return on assets was also positively related to financing 
rates for both forms however, the effect is significant for 
Istisna (model 12). It showed that higher financing rate 
leads to higher returns afterwards, It could mean, in case of 
Istisna,  that banks were funding business that were more 
cyclical in nature, whereas in Murabaha financing, funds 
were invested in core activities that didn’t significantly 
move with the rates. 
In model 13 and 14, profit margins had inverse effect on 
tenor, the effect is significant for Istisna. This showed that 
long term projects yields more profit as compared to short 
term, however the effect was not significant for Murabaha. 
Similar result were found with Fixed assets turnover and 
Return on Assets, as it positively and significantly affected 
the tenor for Istisna (model 14), indicating more 
efficiencies in longer run, however it remained 
insignificant for Murabaha. At last, interest coverage ratio 
largely remained in significant in all models.. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Asymmetric information topic has widely discussed in relation 
with conventional banks. Some studies have been done on 
asymmetric information in relation with Islamic financial 
contracts as it discussed in literature review but majority 
studies are on equity base Islamic financial contracts like 
Musharkah and mudarba with respect to both aspect adverse 
selection and moral hazard, the studies shows that both 
problem exist in Musharkah and mudarbah and has been 
discussed their solution. There is another type of Islamic 
financial contract which is consider on debt base i.e 
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Murabaha, Istisna few article are on one side of effect of 
asymmetric information as moral hazard in Murabaha but no 
study found on Istisna in connection with moral hazard and 
adverse selection. 
This study not only focused on Murabaha but also 
compared it with Istisna, It proved that Murabaha also 
have the problems of adverse selection in a way that at 
time of selection of a customer a bank may make mistake 
in credit worthiness checking of client, however, it can be 
cover by taking security. In Istisna it can be covered by not 
making disbursement till time of delivery of final product 
to the bank although as per sharia disbursement to 
customer is allowed before the delivery as well as at time 
of making Istisna order, but practically if the Islamic banks 
restrict the disbursement till delivery the product will not 
remain viable for market because the customer needs 
financing for purchasing the raw material, although it is 
risky which leads to moral hazard 
We selected three years annual data of 35 customers with 
the 105 number of observation of Islamic bank, which are 
utilizing many sharia compliant financing facilities, but I 
select two: istisna and Murabaha financing products in 
different commodities like cotton bales, fertilizer, 
pesticide, oil cake, rice, wheat seed, cotton seed, 
chipboard, fans, auto parts, canola seed and medicines. We 
found no payment delay in all customer which are from 
very different segments unlike in case of conventional 
financing, where this ratio relatively high. In Islamic 
financing contract, the disbursement amount actually 
placed in asset which has its monetary value so in case of 
any loss due to availability of actual asset customer can 
recover major portion of his disbursed amount and will be 
able to pay the bank financing at the time of maturity, but 
in the conventional bank, the disbursed amount did not 
inject directly in physical asset so at time of repayment if 
customer has not got enough, liquidity he would default. 
This leads to the problem moral hazard ultimately. Hence, 
the injection of disbursed amount in real asset is more 
beneficial for economy. 
Recommendations 
The study suggested that SME and Commercial sector to 
finance their projects under the Islamic financial contracts. It 
is more secure and disciplined way for both the sectors. 
Benefit of using these contracts is firstly to avoid interest-
based transactions, also these contact does not create the 
bubble in economy, which can burst at any time 
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Table 3: 
Descriptive Statistic (Murabaha financing) 
 DA SPRED PR TENOR PM TAT EM FAT ROA ICR 
Mean 4868653 0.022594 0.096346 148.2762 0.209546 5.271286 1.690048 83.51522 0.466732 0.838144 
 Median 2000000 0.0225 0.0868 178 0.0699 3.50137 1.2189 15.76127 0.2241 0.2659 
 Maximum 25000000 0.0565 0.951 270 7.51657 71.40822 7.80021 964.8595 10.1659 10.705 
 Minimum 125000 0.01 0.0716 1 0.00271 0.08189 0.16777 0.1108 0.0162 0.0175 
 Std. Dev. 6570561 0.011326 0.084895 62.0977 0.749522 7.606361 1.384871 189.9784 1.091595 2.256208 
 Skewness 2.020009 0.769974 9.853098 -0.12034 9.009218 6.442254 1.917884 3.324476 7.216809 4.027875 
 Kurtosis 6.113479 3.37444 99.71429 2.15708 87.78951 55.70852 6.847657 13.60189 61.89783 17.7666 
 Jarque-Bera 113.8178 10.98845 42621.19 3.361932 32873.42 12880.87 129.1394 685.163 16088.12 1237.896 
 Probability 0 0.00411 0 0.186194 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
 
Table 4: 
Descriptive Statistic (istisna financing) 
 DA SPREAD PR TENOR PM TAT EM FAT ROA ICR 
 Mean 11337259 0.020625 0.096258 114.1667 0.094464 3.820821 2.981174 190.9057 0.265353 0.315242 
 Median 11292534 0.0225 0.0938 90 0.0583 2.839515 0.991115 19.61888 0.1969 0.16465 
 Maximum 29583360 0.03 0.1159 180 0.39321 13.11266 64.71127 1939.676 1.4742 2.5346 
 Minimum 1160430 0.01 0.0721 60 0.0001 0.25657 0.15068 1.22244 0.0007 0.0175 
 Std. Dev. 7775263 0.007328 0.012527 47.29089 0.100509 2.861496 10.65358 447.9905 0.285906 0.453498 
 Skewness 0.816737 -0.24978 -0.03201 0.317256 1.71419 1.250137 5.631386 2.87391 2.580821 3.585734 
 Kurtosis 3.347564 1.881462 2.319252 1.509492 4.874004 4.402553 33.1287 10.38909 10.61087 17.36472 
 Jarque-Bera 4.183553 2.251022 0.701275 3.936327 22.89852 12.32779 1551.883 131.4541 126.8519 386.6626 
 Probability 0.123468 0.324487 0.704239 0.139713 0.000011 0.002104 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
 
Table 5: T-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
 
  Mean Variance t Stat P value (two-tail) 
Disbursed Amount 
Murabaha 4868652.95 4.317E+13 
-4.473934 4.098E-05 Tigara/Istisna 11337259.25 6.045E+13 
SPREAD 
Murabaha 0.022592143 0.0001283 
1.1941622 0.2354193 Tigara/Istisna 0.020625 5.371E-05 
Profit Rate % 
Murabaha 0.096345714 0.0072072 
0.0102272 0.9918576 Tigara/Istisna 0.096258333 0.0001569 
Tenor 
Murabaha 148.2761905 3856.1249 
3.4307706 0.0009599 Tigara/Istisna 114.1666667 2236.4286 
Profit Margin 
Murabaha 0.20954618 0.5617825 
1.5336053 0.1278974 Tigara/Istisna 0.094465318 0.0101018 
Total assets turnover 
Murabaha 5.27128662 57.856728 
1.6439478 0.1024633 Tigara/Istisna 3.820820235 8.1881596 
Equity multiplier 
Murabaha 1.690048252 1.9178672 
-0.725054 0.473239 Tigara/Istisna 2.98117466 113.49866 
Fixed Asset turnover 
Murabaha 83.51521608 36091.792 
-1.395906 0.1706391 Tigara/Istisna 190.9057377 200695.48 
Return on Assets 
Murabaha 0.466730561 1.1915714 
1.7256025 0.0867241 Tigara/Istisna 0.265352763 0.0817412 
interest Coverage Ratio Murabaha 0.83814381 5.0904723 2.246192 0.0264473 
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Tigara/Istisna 0.315241667 0.2056607 
      
 Table 6:  
Correlations (Murabaha financing) 
 DA SPREAD PR TENOR PM TAT EM FAT ROA ICR 
DA 1          
SPREAD -0.27472 1         
PR -0.09311 0.092426 1        
TENOR -0.01075 -0.0843 0.042247 1       
PM 0.031218 -0.12306 0.009017 0.082282 1      
TAT -0.08757 0.116757 -0.03406 -0.06473 -0.11296 1     
EM 0.249122 -0.00623 -0.04887 -0.17097 0.131437 -0.27927 1    
FAT -0.14753 0.001317 -0.04144 -0.07998 -0.08376 0.27007 -0.08386 1   
ROA 0.022575 -0.11195 -0.00483 0.140907 0.92926 -0.00232 -0.00657 -0.06791 1  
ICR -0.06703 0.081098 -0.00194 -0.15856 -0.05555 -0.02268 -0.04602 0.342279 -0.04688 1 
 
Table 7:  
Correlations (istisna financing) 
 DA SPREAD PR TENOR PM TAT EM FAT ROA ICR 
DA 1          
SPREAD -0.32479 1         
PR -0.41417 -0.16076 1        
TENOR 0.010577 -0.80535 0.554143 1       
PM 0.271207 0.121269 -0.31829 -0.30769 1      
TAT -0.31966 0.068242 0.270035 -0.00617 -0.34183 1     
EM 0.421303 0.030758 -0.11262 -0.07605 -0.13625 -0.23603 1    
FAT -0.41584 0.388901 -0.05242 -0.2192 -0.21631 0.36147 -0.06091 1   
ROA -0.01726 0.040757 -0.10336 -0.19104 0.545513 0.342778 -0.17506 -0.03569 1  
ICR 0.132256 -0.00123 -0.37336 -0.01824 0.058583 -0.2204 -0.0145 -0.05885 -0.0884 1 
 
Table 8:  
Regression equation result 
   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
   
Murabaha Istisna Murabaha Istisna Murabaha Istisna 
   
Dependent Variable 



















Coefficient 4868653 11337259 1.326763 0.020625 4.883189 4.563633 
t-Statistic 3.26E+15 1.51E+15 18.01226 7.55E+14 1.21E+15 1.12E+15 
Prob.   0 0 0 0 0 0 
TA 
Coefficient 8.48E-14 1.67E-14 -2.02E-07 5.27E-23 2.20E-19 5.36E-21 
t-Statistic 6.869016 1.179882 -0.33093 1.021551 6.595607 0.699548 
Prob.   0 0.2534 0.7418 0.3205 0 0.4932 
TL 
Coefficient -9.07E-14 -1.71E-13 -1.53E-07 -6.67E-22 -1.43E-19 -6.73E-20 
t-Statistic -4.81221 -1.52776 -0.16429 -1.6295 -2.81428 -1.10784 
Prob.   0 0.144 0.87 0.1206 0.0065 0.2825 
SALE 
Coefficient -6.97E-15 7.10E-14 -2.15E-07 2.59E-22 2.57E-20 3.68E-20 
t-Statistic -2.63802 3.38702 -1.6498 3.385334 3.594217 3.239574 
Prob.   0.0105 0.0033 0.1039 0.0033 0.0006 0.0045 
NP 
Coefficient -1.17E-14 0 2.06E-08 -1.75E-22 -2.23E-20 8.98E-20 
t-Statistic -1.19641 0 0.042645 -0.50374 -0.84463 1.736886 
Prob.   0.236 1 0.9661 0.6206 0.4015 0.0995 
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R-squared 1 1 0.976313 1 1 1 
Adjusted R-squared 1 1 0.961508 1 1 1 
F-statistic 3.51E+30 1.32E+30 65.94629 8.79E+28 2.27E+29 2.16E+30 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Durbin-Watson stat 3.034791 2.512496 1.515861 2.528205 2.815141 2.240126 
 Table 9:  
Regression equation result 
Periods included: 3 (2016 2018) 
Companies included: 35 for Murabaha and 12 for Tijara and Istisna 
Total panel observations: 105 for Murabaha, and 36 for Tijara and Istisna 
Effects Specification: 1. Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 2. Period fixed (dummy variables). 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Murabah Istisna Murabah Istisna Murabah Istisna Murabah Istisna 
Dependent Variable 



















Coefficient 4868653 11337259 0.022594 0.020625 0.097613 0.096258 147.6912 114.1667 
t-Statistic 8.68E+14 2.06E+15 5.48E+14 2.38E+15 4.20E+00 4.16E+15 27.96855 9.38E+14 
Prob. 0 0 0 0 0.0001 0 0 0 
PM 
Coefficient 4.92E-08 1.26E-08 2.76E-16 1.90E-16 -1.57E-03 -5.24E-16 -2.507764 -2.04E-12 
t-Statistic 4.421539 0.3378 3.372805 3.242665 -0.03404 -3.35607 -0.239335 -2.4852 
Prob. 0 0.7399 0.0013 0.0051 0.973 0.004 0.8116 0.0244 
TAT 
Coefficient -5.73E-10 2.06E-09 -7.94E-19 3.32E-18 -3.23E-04 -1.12E-17 -0.278474 -1.15E-14 
t-Statistic -1.41543 1.806613 -0.26658 1.84579 -0.19212 -2.33601 -0.730447 -0.45658 
Prob. 0.1619 0.0897 0.7907 0.0835 0.8483 0.0328 0.4679 0.6541 
EM 
Coefficient -1.72E-08 9.48E-11 -1.38E-16 6.71E-19 -9.84E-04 -2.59E-18 0.784259 -5.46E-15 
t-Statistic -6.62061 0.401951 -7.22397 1.805494 -0.09137 -2.6208 0.320848 -1.04933 
Prob. 0 0.693 0 0.0898 0.9275 0.0185 0.7494 0.3096 
FAT 
Coefficient 3.22E-11 1.77E-11 9.01E-20 -4.45E-20 1.35E-05 4.76E-20 0.000389 4.65E-16 
t-Statistic 1.387443 1.697593 0.528691 -2.71063 0.140065 1.088375 0.017831 2.020786 
Prob. 0.1703 0.1089 0.5989 0.0154 0.8891 0.2926 0.9858 0.0604 
ROA 
Coefficient -3.50E-08 -3.96E-10 -2.00E-16 -4.85E-17 2.13E-03 1.93E-16 2.865672 7.85E-13 
t-Statistic -4.60894 -0.03227 -3.57496 -2.51129 0.06753 3.755108 0.400819 2.899575 
Prob. 0 0.9747 0.0007 0.0231 0.9464 0.0017 0.6899 0.0105 
ICR 
Coefficient -8.33E-10 1.02E-08 1.55E-18 6.31E-18 3.68E-04 0 -0.139678 1.55E-13 
t-Statistic -0.66846 2.291651 0.16934 0.903412 0.071191 0 -0.119114 1.58471 
Prob. 0.5063 0.0358 0.8661 0.3797 0.9435 1 0.9056 0.1326 
Adjusted R-squared 1 1 1 1 -0.06035 1 0.897888 1 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 0 0 0 0.696332 0 0.00 0 
 Durbin-Watson stat 2.773731 2.046115 2.793367 2.317264 4.434157 2.275504 4.400719 1.9269 
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